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Lamont, P. (in press). The making of extraordinary psychological phenomena. Journal of the 
History of the Behavioural Sciences. 
 
This article is about extraordinary phenomena, and what people have made of them. The 
phenomena in question are those associated with unorthodox areas of psychological 
knowledge - Psychology’s ‘occult doubles’ (Leahey & Leahey, 1984) - namely, mesmerism, 
spiritualism, psychical research and parapsychology. The history of unorthodox psychological 
knowledge has been written about extensively in recent decades, largely with a view to 
understanding the various ways in which scientific knowledge and practices relate to the 
wider social and cultural contexts within which they are produced.
1
 This article focuses on the 
ongoing disputes over the reality of the phenomena associated with (one might say the very 
basis of) these unorthodox areas of psychological knowledge. It does so as part of the history 
of both Psychology and psychology (to adopt Graham Richards’s (2002) useful shorthand 
distinction between, respectively, the discipline and its subject matter). This particular focus, 
like Richards’s shorthand, is part of a wider argument about the need for history as a part of 
Psychology, based on the view that Psychology has a reflexive relationship with its own 
subject matter. In short, Psychology is not only the study of thought and behaviour but also 
the product of thought and behaviour, produced by certain people (Psychologists) thinking 
and behaving in certain ways (doing Psychology). How Psychologists do Psychology is 
shaped by the social context in which they do it, and this results in particular versions of 
psychological knowledge. What history shows is that, at different times and in different 
places, Psychology has taken a variety of forms, and that in defining both what can be studied 
and how it should be studied, it has produced radically different versions of what we are (e.g. 
Danziger, 1990, 1997; Graumann & Gergen, 1996; Hacking, 1986, 1995a; Kusch, 1999; 
Richards, 2002; Smith, 1997, 2005, 2007). It is, therefore, essential to psychological 
understanding that we are aware of how psychological knowledge comes to be what it is, and 
how that in turn shapes our understanding of ourselves. 
 
The history of unorthodox psychological knowledge has been a fruitful topic in which to 
explore the constructed nature of psychological knowledge, the various disputes over what 
has counted as orthodoxy having provided some exemplary cases of boundary-work over 
scientific status and expertise (e.g. Shapin, 1979; Collins & Pinch, 1982; Gieryn, 1983; Coon, 
                                                 
1
 Key texts include: Wallis (ed.) (1979); Mauskopf and McVaugh (1980); Collins & Pinch 
(1982); McLenon (1984); Leahey & Leahey (1984); Oppenheim (1985); Cerullo (1992); Hess 
(1993); Crabtree (1993); Winter (1998); Luckhurst (2001). For a recent overview of much of 
the literature, see: Noakes (2008). 
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1992; Hess, 1993; Noakes, 2004; Wolffram, 2006; Aprem, 2010). Several scholars have 
identified discursive patterns in the form of particular disputes about the reality of such 
phenomena and the scientificity of studying them (e.g. Collins & Pinch, 1979; Gieryn, 1983; 
McLenon, 1984; Hess, 1993; Lamont, 2007a; Zingrone, unpub’d). Disputes over 
extraordinary phenomena, like scientific disputes on other matters (e.g. Gilbert & Mulkay, 
1984), help us understand the discursive construction of what comes to count as orthodox 
scientific knowledge.  
 
However, these disputes can also shed light on psychological matters. After all, throughout all 
of this, the disputants have not only been negotiating scientific status and expertise, they have 
also been expressing beliefs about the phenomena in question. Indeed, the disputes over 
scientific status and expertise in the study of extraordinary phenomena have themselves 
emerged from, and have been part of, more widespread disputes about the reality of such 
phenomena, and these were, at the end of the day, expressions of belief about the phenomena. 
By considering these scientific disputes as manifestations of belief, it is argued that 
Psychological understanding of beliefs, far from being an objective study of a psychological 
topic, has been an ongoing expression of the beliefs it has purported to study. And, as we 
shall see, these disputes can themselves contribute to how we understand such beliefs.  
 
 
Making the facts 
 
There have been countless extraordinary phenomena associated with mesmerism, 
spiritualism, psychical research and parapsychology. Despite their different names, theoretical 
associations and historical contexts, they have nevertheless shared the core feature that makes 
it possible to discuss them together, namely that they have been viewed by both proponents 
and critics as extraordinary or anomalous in relation to normal human experience and 
contemporary scientific knowledge. Thus, while individuals, including scientists, have 
obviously disagreed over the plausibility of such phenomena (depending upon their particular 
views about how the physical world might work), it is because people have thought them 
extraordinary, and most scientists have thought them incompatible with current scientific 
knowledge, that the disputes in question took place.  
 
 3 
In disputes over the reality of such phenomena, since at least the nineteenth century, both 
proponents and critics have consistently appealed to the facts.
2
 However, facts do not speak 
for themselves. In order to be deployed in an argument, they need to be not only made 
relevant but also made convincing; they need to be described, and in such a way that they are 
treated by others as factual (Potter, 1996). Thus, when proponents have cited particular facts, 
their fact-ness (that they really happened) has invariably been constructed via appeals to the 
reliability of the observation. For reasons that are hardly difficult to imagine, observers of 
extraordinary phenomena have always described events in terms that stressed they were 
accurate descriptions of real events, and not the result of, say, imagination, hallucination, 
hypnosis, and so on. This has ranged from making relevant the conditions at the time (such as 
lighting) to explicit avowals of sobriety and honesty.
3
 
 
However, extraordinary facts need to be made not only real but also extraordinary. Thus, 
descriptions of these facts have also been based on the exclusion of alternative (‘ordinary’) 
explanations. For example, when lucid somnambulists displayed the ability to see whilst 
blindfolded, when mediums moved objects or provided details about sitters, or when thought-
readers obtained information from others, their ability to have done these things through 
ordinary means (such as, respectively, peeking, the secret use of hands and feet, prior 
research, or the use of codes) was regularly excluded as part of any reported observation (e.g. 
Podmore, 1902; Beloff, 1993). In short, it has always been an essential part of the argument 
for the reality of any extraordinary phenomenon, both by definition and in practice, that the 
event really occurred as described, and was not the result of ordinary processes. 
 
Such arguments, of course, have not always been believed. Critics have argued against the 
reality of the phenomena (by appealing to possible errors in observation or report), and they 
have argued against their extraordinariness (by claiming that the event might be the result of 
ordinary processes, such as chance or fraud). Such arguments were made on a regular basis 
by critics of mesmerism and spiritualism, and have continued to be made ever since (e.g. 
Podmore, 1902; Collins & Pinch, 1979; McClenon, 1984). They have been popular because 
they are always compatible with any given report. One can never exclude the possibility of 
                                                 
2
 Several scholars have discussed how, in the seventeenth century, supposedly theory-neutral 
‘matters of fact’ became a fundamental feature of scientific knowledge, and have noted their 
dependence upon notions of probability and credible testimony, not least when they described 
extraordinary or miraculous phenomena (e.g. Shapiro, 1983; Dear, 1990; Daston, 1991; 
Shapin, 1994; Serjeantson, 1999). While the rhetorical and social features of such testimony 
are no doubt relevant to a longer view, this article limits its scope to the period since c.1840. 
3
 For a good range of examples of accounts of spiritualist phenomena that deploy such 
themes, see: London Dialectical Society (1871).  For examples of recent analyses of the 
rhetoric of such accounts, see: Wooffitt (1992); Lamont (2007a). 
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errors in observation, nor can one exclude the possibility of fraud since, by its very nature, 
successful deception relies upon methods that are unknown (this is why, when one observes a 
magic trick, and does not know how it is done, one need not conclude that it is a genuine 
miracle, but simply assume there was some kind of deception involved). Rhetorically 
speaking, what such arguments do is warrant an alternative ‘sceptical’ conclusion that is 
compatible with the evidence, but that avoids the need to provide a more detailed explanation 
of what actually happened (Lamont, Coelho & McKinlay, 2009). In short, there has been a 
perennial counter-argument - either the alleged event did not really happen, or else, if it did, 
then there is an ordinary explanation for it – that can be made against any claim about an 
extraordinary event. Thus, by making this argument, one can always maintain a position of 
disbelief in the face of reported extraordinary facts. 
 
Though observations of extraordinary phenomena have been the most obvious facts in 
dispute, there have been other kinds of observed facts that have been cited as equally relevant, 
and which have been cited primarily as negative evidence. First, mesmerists, mediums and 
psychics have regularly failed in their attempts to display the phenomena. Second, critics, 
particularly sceptical conjurors, have often used trickery to demonstrate similar phenomena, 
and have claimed that these ‘duplications’ show that such phenomena can be produced by 
ordinary means. Third, many individuals were allegedly caught cheating, and these 
‘exposures’ have been presented as clear proof of fraud. Failures, duplications and exposures 
were regularly held up as negative evidence against the reality of mesmeric, spiritualist and 
psychic phenomena, and have continued to be in disputes over paranormal phenomena more 
recently. They have, of course, been framed by critics as facts that self-evidently argue 
against the reality of such phenomena. However, as we shall see, proponents have long 
argued that such a conclusion is far from self-evident. 
 
Proponents have, of course, often disputed whether a given episode constituted a failure, an 
accurate duplication or a legitimate exposure. And, when they have accepted that a particular 
case did indeed constitute a failure, duplication or exposure, they have at the same time 
appealed to other evidence of success, of phenomena that have not been duplicated, and of 
individuals who have not been exposed. Such disputes can be found in countless references 
throughout the literature.
4
 However, what may be more surprising is that even when a 
particular episode has been accepted as a failure, duplication or exposure, proponents have 
                                                 
4
 For some examples of disputes over failures, duplications and exposures, see: Weekes 
(1843); Vernon (1844); ‘Anti-mesmerism’, Bristol Mercury, 8 February, 1845, p. 8; ‘The 
Davenport brothers’, Spiritual Magazine, 5(11), 1864, p. 522; ‘Spiritualism at Brighton—the 
Davenports’ double’, Spiritual Magazine, 6(3), 1865,  p. 127; ‘A séance with Miss Cook’, 
Spiritual Magazine, 1(12), 1873, p. 555-559; Podmore (1902) p. 89. 
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been able to frame it as evidence supporting, rather than challenging, the reality of the 
phenomena. 
 
Demonstrations of extraordinary phenomena have regularly failed. Yet even when proponents 
have accepted that a particular episode was a failure, they have nevertheless framed it as 
positive evidence in favour of the reality of the phenomena. For example, when lucid 
somnambulists failed to display clairvoyance, proponents argued that this was the result of 
particular conditions that were not conducive to lucid somnambulism (Weekes, 1843; 
Vernon, 1844; Gregory, 1851). Failure could also be framed as evidence that trickery was not 
involved since, if it were a trick, it should work every time. According to one observer of 
lucid somnambulism (in which a subject attempted to see whilst blindfolded), ‘exceptions to 
his general accuracy were, however, to me proofs of the absence of all collusion’ (A lover of 
truth, 1844). Thus, occasional failure was presented as a result of the nature of the 
phenomena, and as positive evidence for its authenticity (Lamont, 2010a). Spiritualists 
regularly made very similar arguments about mediums who failed: such failures were only to 
be expected since mediums were not in control of the phenomena, and the fact that they 
happened was evidence that there was no fraud involved.
5
 Central to this argument was the 
idea that individuals were not in control of whatever mechanism allowed the phenomena to 
occur, an idea that has remained a feature of psychics since, and has continued to allow 
failure to be framed as evidence of this lack of control, and against there being trickery 
involved (Fuller, 1975; Lamont & Wiseman, 1999). Indeed, psychical researchers and 
parapsychologists have often appealed to the elusiveness of psi as a reason for failure to 
replicate positive results (Beloff, 1994). Thus, what has been said of more recent scientific 
controversies (Collins & Pinch, 1982; Collins, 1992) can be extended to disputes over 
extraordinary phenomena since at least the beginning of the Victorian period. In short, by 
framing failure as evidence of the nature of the phenomena, and as evidence against fraud, 
seemingly negative evidence can be, and has been, framed as positive evidence by 
proponents. 
 
Similarly, duplications of extraordinary phenomena by trickery, even when accepted as such, 
have been framed as evidence for the reality of the phenomena. For example, analogies have 
been made with money, something that is genuine but can also be counterfeited.
6
 More 
commonly, however, duplications have themselves been framed as genuine phenomena. For 
                                                 
5
 The idea that mediums could be expected to fail as they were not in control was a 
widespread theme. For an example of failure being seen as evidence of a lack of trickery, see: 
‘The Davenport brothers’, Spiritual Magazine, 1864, 5(11), p. 503. 
6
 ‘Thackeray and Dickens on Spiritualism’, Spiritual Magazine, 1860, 1(9), 388; Home, 1888, 
p. 218 
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example, performances of blindfolded vision in 1845, presented as mere entertainment and in 
direct contrast to lucid somnambulism, could nevertheless by viewed as genuine 
clairvoyance, and spiritualists later did the same with avowed duplications by trickery, 
sometimes even arguing with the performer that he was wrong to deny his mediumistic 
powers.
7
 Indeed, it has been the common experience of mentalists (magicians who simulate 
extrasensory perception) that, even when explicitly told that a particular feat is not 
paranormal, some people nevertheless express a belief that it is (Lamont & Wiseman, 1999). 
Both by analogy with (other) genuine phenomena that have been faked, and by framing 
avowed forgeries as genuine, duplications have been constructed as evidence in favour of the 
reality of the phenomena. 
 
Finally, exposures of fraud have been disputed not only in terms of whether they counted as 
an exposure, but also in terms of what an acknowledged exposure has meant as evidence. On 
many occasions, proponents have accepted that a particular episode amounted to an exposure 
but nevertheless framed the events as evidence in favour of the reality of the phenomena. For 
example, when the well-known mesmeric clairvoyant, George Goble, openly confessed to 
having cheated in 1845, it was argued by his mentor that this was caused by the same 
mesmeric state that was supposed to induce his clairvoyant abilities (Forbes, 1845). The 
attribution of fraudulent behaviour to some aspect of the phenomena in question continued. 
By 1862, it was already being said by spiritualists that it was ‘lamentably common that 
mediums sometimes “helped the spirits”’, and the accepted cheating of several mediums then 
(e.g. Foster, Colchester) and since (e.g. the Davenports, Slade, Palladino) has been attributed 
either to bad spirits, or to the pressure of producing phenomena over which they had no 
control.
8
 More recent psychics have been defended in similar ways, and the argument that an 
individual can cheat yet also be genuine has been a familiar theme in psychical research 
(Beloff, 1991; Braude, 1997). By attributing fraud to the phenomena in question, either 
directly or else to the result of pressure brought about by its uncontrollable nature, fraud has 
been long framed as an unfortunate by-product of the phenomena. 
 
                                                 
7
 For examples of ‘The Mysterious Lady’, a popular entertainer of the 1840S, being framed as 
genuine, see: Paris (1853), p. 122; Lee (1866), p. 435. For examples of spiritualists framing 
avowed duplications as genuine, see:  ‘Wonderful manifestations in India’, Spiritual 
Magazine, 6(3), 1865, p. 120; ‘The Miracle Circle’, Spiritual Magazine, 6(12), 1865, p. 559; 
‘Mr Sothern and the Miracle Circle’, Spiritual Magazine, 1(1), 1866, p. 44; Podmore, 1902, 
ii, 62; Doyle (1930). 
8
 On Foster and Colchester, see: ‘Mr S. C. Hall and Mr Foster’, Spiritual Magazine, 1862, 
3(2), p. 91; ‘The press and the mediums’, Spiritualism Magazine, 1862, 2(4), p. 153. On 
cheating mediums being blamed on unconscious influence, see: ‘Cheating mediums’, 
Spiritual Magazine, 1862, 3(6), p. 273; ‘A painful controversy’, Spiritual Magazine, 1874, 
9(6), pp. 280-1; Podmore, 1902, ii, p. 109. Braude (1997), p. 95. 
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All the observed facts, whether demonstrations of extraordinary phenomena or of failure, 
duplication by ordinary means or exposure of fraud, have been disputed not simply in terms 
of what has been observed but also in terms of what agreed observations have meant as 
evidence. In doing so, all of the facts have been interpreted and presented as evidence both for 
and against the reality of the phenomena. Clearly, not all of the above arguments have been 
used in disputes over every instance, but they have been a part of the debate for a very long 
time, and have regularly been used to maintain a position of belief or disbelief in the face of 
potentially challenging facts. Disbelief has been maintained by framing all the observed 
phenomena as the product of error and fraud, whilst belief has been maintained by framing all 
(seemingly) negative observations as evidence of the phenomena. Many people, of course, 
have changed their positions, but such arguments have meant that nobody has needed to do so 
on the basis of even the agreed facts, since any given fact might be taken as evidence in 
support of one’s existing view. The inability to settle the matter by appeal to observation 
alone has meant that the ongoing dispute has simultaneously appealed to expertise in 
observation, which shall be considered in the next section. 
 
Meanwhile, it is worth noting that what has been said so far is in line with what has already 
been said of recent parapsychology experiments (Collins & Pinch, 1982). Indeed, according 
to Collins (1992), that an agreed failure to produce psi in a given experiment has been taken 
as confirmation of opposing beliefs can be seen, like disputes over what counts as a 
replication, as an example of how ‘[i]t is not the regularity of the world that imposes itself on 
our senses but the regularity of our institutionalized beliefs that imposes itself on the world’ 
(Collins, 1992, p. 148). However, as Barnes, Bloor and Henry (1996) have suggested, 
parapsychologists nevertheless distinguish between positive and negative findings, a 
distinction most likely prompted by something out there in the physical world (p. 76). Indeed, 
what these disputes show is that while proponents and critics can indeed come to opposing 
conclusions about the agreed facts, this is not without some discursive work in order to 
reframe the facts as evidence that supports, rather than challenges, their own position.  
 
What all of this shows is that, though we cannot regard these disputes as evidence that our 
beliefs about the world are immune to the world itself, we can treat them as examples of how 
beliefs are constructed and maintained in the social world. After all, whatever else they were, 
these disputes were expressions of belief either that such phenomena were real or that they 
were not. And this was not merely a case of individuals who held certain beliefs justifying 
their own positions; these disputes were a means through which positions of belief themselves 
were formulated and maintained. Beliefs (and disbeliefs) were adopted and persisted in a 
context of awareness of opposing points of view, and were necessarily bound up with, and 
 8 
depended upon, reasons for holding them. As discursive psychologists have shown, 
expressions of belief are not merely outer expressions of inner beliefs but are produced in and 
for a social context, designed to address potential difficulties (e.g. Edwards, 1992), and even 
what appear to be purely descriptive statements about paranormal phenomena involve subtle 
warranting (Wooffitt, 1992). Designed for a hostile audience, these disputes were, and 
remain, the most detailed evidence of beliefs about extraordinary phenomena that we have. 
They may have been outward expressions of individual cognitive processes, differential 
factors were no doubt at play, and cognitive dissonance might be invoked in order to explain 
belief persistence, but the forms that they took and the ways in which they were maintained 
were manifested in social interaction. Whatever inaccessible thoughts might have gone 
through the heads of disputants, this was how beliefs were made socially real, and so far as 
expressions of belief reflect unspoken beliefs, they reflected what people actually believed. 
 
The relationship between discourse and cognition is, of course, a much larger question, but in 
history at least, we must deal with discourse, and in the discursive construction and 
maintenance of their respective beliefs, both proponents and critics have consistently 
appealed to expertise in observation. Appeals to the facts themselves were, as we have seen, 
inadequate since they were often disputed and, even when agreed upon, their meaning as 
evidence could always be disputed. Furthermore, while proponents have always ruled out 
ordinary means (e.g. trickery was impossible), and critics have regularly appealed to 
undetected ordinary methods (e.g. there may have been special apparatus), there is no 
observable difference between a genuine psychic feat and a fraudulent one based upon an 
undetected method (Lamont & Wiseman, 1999). For example, if one sees a human levitate, 
but cannot see any wires, one can frame it as genuine (because there were no wires) or as a 
trick (the wires must have been cleverly concealed), but the choice is not based upon different 
observations. Thus, all that a proponent has been able to argue is that, had there been an 
ordinary method, it would have been detected.
9
 For this reason, disputes over the facts have 
always been in some sense disputes over expertise in observation. However, as we shall see, 
they were also very much statements of and about belief, in that beliefs about the phenomena 
were not only constructed and maintained, but were also a topic through which both the facts 
and expertise could be disputed.  
 
 
                                                 
9
 This indeed has been the explicit claim in countless cases, for example: ‘A rap on the 
knuckles’, Spiritual Magazine, 1860, 1(9), 407-13; ‘Mr C. H. Foster’, Spiritual Magazine, 
1862, 3(1), pp. 37-40; ‘Mr S. C. Hall and Mr Foster’, Spiritual Magazine, 1862, 3(2), p. 91; 
London Dialectical Society (1873), pp. 134-5; Cox (1974); Braude (1997), p. 96. 
 9 
The making of expertise 
 
In an experimental context, disputes have invariably been about whether the conditions of the 
experiment were such that ordinary methods could have been involved. However, the lack of 
agreement over what counts as appropriate conditions or adequate controls, and the ever-
present possibility that any procedures might not be applied correctly, means that these 
disputes have also come back to matters of adequate scientific expertise. Thus, scientists on 
both sides of the dispute have appealed to such things as academic qualifications, membership 
of scientific associations, and specialist knowledge deemed essential for a scientific 
investigation (e.g. McClenon, 1984; Winter, 1998; Lamont, 2004; Noakes, 2004). However, 
disputes over extraordinary phenomena have always been conducted in a wider context than 
that of the experiment, and have been about more than scientific expertise. What has always 
been the case is that proponents have had to argue that they were competent to observe 
accurately and to exclude ordinary explanations, and scientific expertise has only been one 
way of doing this.  
 
Indeed, one of the most persistent themes in these disputes has been that no particular 
expertise is needed in order to observe facts with one’s own eyes. At the same time as 
Victorian scientists were arguing that special training was essential to proper observation, 
observers of spiritualist phenomena were appealing to their senses as a means of establishing 
the facts, regardless of their implausibility or any particular expertise.
10
 Indeed, the idea that 
specialist knowledge was necessary in order to be a reliable observer of facts could be 
forcefully rejected. Benjamin Coleman resented being thought ‘not qualified to judge of plain 
matters of facts made patent to our senses, because, forsooth, we are deficient in scientific 
training! You insult our practical common sense and earn our contempt for your scientific 
nonsense’, and many others have more subtly questioned the particular expertise of scientists 
in matters of observation, even whilst acknowledging that it is scientists’ job to explain the 
(observed) facts.
11
 And, despite the growing use by critics since of arguments about the 
fallibility of observation, it has continued to be claimed that ordinary witnesses are no more 
prone to flawed observations than scientists (e.g. Braude, 1997). Certainly, scientists (and 
non-scientists) on both sides of the disputes have appealed to scientific credentials where 
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 For example: ‘The Saturday Review’, Spiritual Magazine, 4(4), 1863, p. 177; ‘Two honest 
letters’, Spiritual Magazine, 4(6), 1863, p. 266; Webster, 1865, pp. 37-8; ‘Spiritual 
manifestations’, Spiritual Magazine, 1870, p. 21. 
11
 Coleman’s quote is from The Spiritualist, 1871, 2, p. 13. For further examples, see: 
‘Extraordinary uproar: lecture on mesmerism’, Northern Star and Leeds Advertiser, 13 
January 1844, p. 2; ‘A letter from William Howitt’, Spiritual Magazine, 2(10), 1861, p. 450; 
Rymer, 1857, p. 41; Webster, 1865, pp. 37-8; ‘Letter from the late Prof Gregory’, Spiritual 
Magazine, 1865, 6(10), p. 452. 
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possible, but both have also appealed to other forms of expertise. For example, some argued 
that legal expertise was as valid as scientific expertise (e.g. Richards, 2001), and both critics 
and proponents have regularly appealed to the expertise of conjurors in order to argue that 
various phenomena could or could not have been the result of trickery.
12
 
 
Nevertheless, scientific expertise has been a major theme within the disputes over the reality 
of such phenomena, and this has provided an opportunity for individuals to construct 
scientific expertise by engaging in boundary-work to exclude unorthodox knowledge from the 
scientific world. As a result, those who have studied extraordinary phenomena have often 
been excluded from membership of scientific institutions and associations, and their work 
from conferences and journals (e.g. Mauskopf & McVaugh, 1980; McClenon, 1984; 
Oppenheim, 1988; Winter, 1998; Luckhurst, 2001). Such exclusion has been significant, since 
it has framed not only those excluded as unscientific but also those included as scientific. 
Nevertheless, all of this can be understood as part of the wider dispute over the reality of the 
phenomena in question, since all of the arguments for expulsion have been based on the view 
that the phenomena were not real.  
 
An example of such boundary-work, and of its location within the wider dispute about the 
reality of the phenomena, can be found in the early days of academic psychology. It has been 
argued that early academic psychologists engaged in particular modes of boundary-work to 
exclude psychical research from the boundaries of scientific psychology, by testing psychics 
and by creating a new area: the psychology of deception and belief (e.g. Coon, 1992; 
Wolffram, 2006). First, this was not simply a dispute between orthodox and unorthodox 
science, since the disputes were themselves about what counted as orthodox and unorthodox; 
indeed, so far as ‘orthodox’ psychologists tested psychics, they were by definition doing 
psychical research. Second, the psychology of deception and belief was hardly an ‘area’ of 
psychology, since publications appeared largely in non-specialist journals, and in such an ad 
hoc fashion that Norman Triplett, when he published a doctoral dissertation on the 
psychology of deception in 1900, was not even aware that Joseph Jastrow had published on 
the topic just a few years earlier (Triplett, 1900). Psychologists such as Jastrow were certainly 
in the business of constructing their own psychological expertise at the same time as they 
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 Examples of proponents’ use of conjuror’s expertise include: ‘The press’, Spiritual 
Magazine, 1860, 1(11), p. 485; ‘Sir William a Beckett the judge’, Spiritual Magazine, 1863, 
4(8), p. 354; ‘Lyon v Home’, Spiritual Magazine, 1868, 3(6), pp. 255-6; London Dialectical 
Society (1873), pp. 134-5; Cox (1974); Margolis (1998), p. 55. Examples of critics include: 
Forbes (1845); ‘Spirit-rapping’, Literary Gazette, 8 September, 1860, pp. 180-1; 
‘Spiritualism’, Fraser’s Magazine, 66, 1862, p. 521; ‘Magic’, British Quarterly Review, 42, 
1865, pp. 76-97; ‘Report on Spiritualism’, Athenaeum, 28 October 1871, pp. 556-8; Marshall 
and Wendt (1980); Randi (1975). 
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dismissed the phenomena, but such boundary-work might be better seen as part of a longer 
tradition, one that was part of the wider dispute about the reality of extraordinary phenomena. 
 
After all, it has been an ongoing theme in the wider dispute about the reality of the 
phenomena that psychological scientists, including those prior to the emergence of 
Psychology as a discipline, have rejected the reality of extraordinary phenomena by 
deploying a ‘psychology of error’ (Lamont, 2010b). By attributing belief in such phenomena 
to poor observation, bias, gullibility and so on, psychological scientists have long dismissed 
the phenomena as they constructed boundaries of psychological expertise between themselves 
and both rivals and the public. For example, in 1845, as Sir John Forbes dismissed 
mesmerism, he contrasted his own expertise with that of mesmerists and the public, both 
groups being described as unscientific, the former biased and the latter gullible, and neither 
capable of making proper observations (Forbes, 1845: xi-ix). William Benjamin Carpenter 
similarly compared his own specialist knowledge with that of both scientific proponents of 
spiritualist phenomena and the public, who were (in his view) incompetent observers, gullible 
and prone to wishful thinking (Carpenter, 1871). With the emergence of academic 
Psychology, early American and German psychologists were merely continuing the trend of 
dismissing the phenomena in terms of incompetence on the part of observers while 
simultaneously presenting themselves as possessing proper expertise, a tradition that has 
continued until more recent times (e.g. Boring, 1960; Alcock, 1980).  
 
Throughout all of this, however, there has been an ongoing circularity, since the topic of 
belief has featured not only as explanandum, but also as an explanation for the reported facts, 
and as an indication of competence (or lack of it) in observing such facts. For example, critics 
have not only explained belief as the result of erroneous observation, but have also cited 
belief in such phenomena as an indication that proponents are incompetent observers. The 
phenomena of mesmerism, spiritualism, psychical research and parapsychology have all been 
rejected by the claim that observers have been guilty of a lack of scepticism, the result in turn 
of inadequate scientific training or a personal desire to believe. Thus, for Forbes (1845), 
‘ordinary’ (i.e. unscientific) observers of mesmeric phenomena accepted them ‘as marvels of 
the highest order and as truths admitting of no question’, Carpenter (1871) regarded ‘a 
proclivity to believe’ as one of the most potent sources of fallacy among unqualified 
observers (p. 342), and Jastrow (1889) claimed that believers were prone to errors in 
observation due to their ‘mental condition’ (p. 730). The idea that belief in such phenomena is 
in itself a sign of an incompetent observer has remained a consistent feature of the dispute, to 
the point that many critics have demanded that psychic phenomena be observed by sceptics 
before being taken seriously, and psychologists continue to suggest that paranormal belief 
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causes people to misinterpret events as paranormal (e.g. Gilovich, 1991; Hergovich, 2004). 
Thus, critics have long cited belief as an indication of incompetence and, via a psychology of 
error, as a way of explaining the facts themselves. 
 
Meanwhile, proponents have also cited belief as an explanation for the facts. Belief has been 
cited as a factor in creating an environment that is conducive to the production of phenomena, 
and a lack of phenomena has regularly been attributed to the presence of disbelievers. For 
example, it was often stated by mesmerists that the influence of sceptical people nearby could 
neutralise the phenomena (Gregory, 1851, p. 22), and spiritualists and psychical researchers 
often complained of the dampening effects of a negative attitude, a problem that has 
continued to be cited in parapsychology experiments (e.g. Crawford, 1916; Collins and Pinch, 
1982). Indeed, the role of personal belief in the production of phenomena has become widely 
accepted in parapsychology, with the so-called sheep-goat effect (that believers are more psi-
conducive than sceptics) being regarded by parapsychologists as one of its most reliable 
findings (Schmeidler, 1958; Beloff, 1993). Thus, proponents have also regularly cited belief 
(including the belief that such phenomena are not real) as an explanation for the facts 
(including the fact that no phenomena occurred). 
 
The longstanding allegation that belief in such phenomena suggests incompetence in 
observation has also been addressed by proponents. On the one hand, they have long argued 
that they are critical thinkers and, therefore, competent observers. In doing so, they have 
invariably claimed that they began as sceptics but changed their minds as a result of the facts. 
For example, Weekes (1843) had been ‘a decided sceptic’ before becoming convinced of the 
reality of lucid somnambulism, Beattie (1877) had, ‘in spite of a bitterly opposed state of 
mind, been compelled to believe in spiritualism’, and Margolis (1998) came to believe that 
Uri Geller was genuine despite ‘considerable scepticism’. On the other hand, they have 
consistently argued, it is critics who have been either ignorant of the facts or else refused to 
believe the facts because of their own narrow-mindedness. For example, W. J. Vernon 
complained of critics of mesmerism who refused to believe the facts because they would 
‘disarrange previous opinions’ (‘Extraordinary uproar’, 1844), Crookes (1874) of critics of 
spiritualism who avoided enquiry into facts that ‘appeared to clash with prevailing opinions’, 
and the argument has continued to the present day (e.g. Braude, 1997).  
 
The to-and-fro has persisted as critics, in turn, have denied the charge of narrow-mindedness, 
invariably claiming that their own enquiries began with a willingness to believe, or even 
initial belief, but that they were forced by the facts to come to a sceptical conclusion. For 
example, J. Q. Rumball, an active debunker of mesmerism, had ‘placed faith in it for some 
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time’ (‘Greenwich lecture hall’, 1844), Carpenter (1871) had pursued an investigation of 
spiritualism until he was ‘forced to the conclusion’ that they were not real (p. 328), and more 
recent prominent sceptics have stressed that they began as firm believers in the paranormal 
(e.g. Couttie, 1988, Blackmore, 2000). These avowals of prior belief, like the avowals of prior 
scepticism, are rhetorically designed in a way that not only constructs the facts as independent 
of the speaker, but also addresses potential accusations of, respectively, narrow-mindedness 
and gullibility (Lamont, 2007b). In short, they make the facts seem more real, and thus the 
speaker’s position more convincing; the facts are supported by appeals to belief, and beliefs 
warranted by appeals to the facts. 
 
These disputes about the facts and expertise have therefore been more than a negotiation of 
scientific boundaries, and belief has been more than a subject of enquiry for academic 
psychologists through which they have engaged in scientific boundary-work. Since before the 
emergence of the discipline, the disputes have been a means of formulating and warranting 
beliefs about the phenomena, and such beliefs have in turn been used (by both proponents and 
critics) to explain the facts, and as an indication of expertise (or lack of it) in the observation 
of facts. In a variety of ways, statements of and about belief have been used by both sides to 
argue about the reality of the phenomena and, in doing so, as a means of constructing and 
maintaining their own respective beliefs.  
 
It is, then, hardly surprising that when belief became a subject of Psychological enquiry, it 
would be similarly entangled in these disputes about the phenomena. And it did eventually 
become a formal topic of enquiry for psychologists, but not only for those who sought to 
exclude psychical research from the world of science. On the contrary, two distinct versions 
of a psychology of belief emerged, each reflecting one side of the ongoing dispute about the 
reality of the phenomena. 
  
 
The making of belief 
 
As discussed above, an informal psychology of error predated the emergence of Psychology 
as a discipline, and the early American psychologists’ psychology of belief was far from 
formal. Indeed a formal psychology of belief, in the sense of a large number of publications in 
scientific journals that drew upon prior work and sought to develop methods and theory, did 
not emerge until the 20
th
 century. When it did, the form(s) it took directly reflected different 
sides of the ongoing disputes about the reality of such phenomena. 
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At the beginning of the 20
th
 century, a psychology of superstition emerged within the United 
States, from a concern about continued superstitious belief even among college students (e.g. 
Dresslar, 1907). Within this educational context, such beliefs were seen as irrational, and as a 
problem to be eradicated (e.g. Dresslar, 1910; Conklin, 1919). An extensive literature 
appeared over the following decades until, in the 1970s, a new psychology of paranormal 
belief appeared (Irwin, 2009). This was driven by similar concerns about growing interest in 
the paranormal, and described paranormal belief as a new superstition (Jones et al, 1977). It 
was also associated with a new sceptical movement centred on the foundation of the 
Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal (CSICOP) and its 
organ, the Skeptical Inquirer. Early contributors to the psychology of paranormal belief were 
members of CSICOP, published in its journal, cited related sceptical literature in their own 
articles, and discussed such beliefs in very similar ways, i.e. as not only wrong but also 
dangerous (e.g. Alcock & Otis, 1980; Alcock, 1981; Otis & Alcock, 1982; Tobacyk, 1983; 
Tobacyk & Milford, 1983). 
 
Meanwhile, at around the same time, another psychology of paranormal belief emerged that 
had its roots in experimental parapsychology. By then, Gertrude Schmeidler had conducted 
experiments that suggested believers in clairvoyance were more successful in psi experiments 
than non-believers, and had coined this the ‘sheep-goat effect’ (Schmeidler & McConnell, 
1958). This seemed to suggest a possible solution to the problem of the elusiveness of psi that 
had faced parapsychologists. It also reflected a longer history of failure to produce the 
phenomena on demand, and of claims that this might be due to the effects of belief (or 
disbelief) on the phenomena. In any case, it led to growing parapsychological interest in the 
question of belief (Lawrence, 1993). 
 
These two psychologies of belief were fundamentally different in terms of what was being 
studied, how it was being measured, what hypotheses were being explored, and the purpose 
of the research itself. For sceptical psychologists, the ‘paranormal’ included not only 
extrasensory perception but also a wide range of other strange phenomena such as witches, 
superstitions, UFOs and the Loch Ness Monster. This wide definition was the product of 
those who regarded all these phenomena as equally erroneous. Indeed, critics of 
parapsychology have long sought to discredit such phenomena by making associations with 
witchcraft and the occult (Collins and Pinch, 1979). This association now became part of the 
scales they used to measure beliefs (Jones et al, 1977; Otis and Alcock, 1983, Tobacyk and 
Milford, 1983). The ongoing view that all such phenomena were the product of error and 
fraud was similarly reflected in the ‘cognitive deficits’ hypothesis they offered, which 
explained paranormal belief in terms of low intelligence, inadequate education, and so on 
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(Irwin, 1993). The purpose of this latest example of the psychology of error was, like 
previous versions, avowedly to understand how beliefs that were not only wrong but also 
harmful might be reduced. 
 
In stark contrast, parapsychologists defined the paranormal far more narrowly (‘psi’ being 
defined as ESP and psychokinesis, and sometimes including survival after death). The scales 
that these researchers used reflected this narrower definition (e.g. Thalbourne & Haraldsson, 
1980), which did not ask about witches or superstitions, and their papers, normally published 
in parapsychology journals, rejected the ‘cognitive deficits’ hypotheses that they felt was part 
of a sceptical agenda (Irwin, 1993; Goulding & Parker, 2001). Indeed, since from their 
perspective, paranormal beliefs were not necessarily wrong, the purpose was not to eradicate 
belief but in part to provide a better understanding of how psi worked, since the elusive 
phenomenon might be more easily found by understanding the sheep-goat effect. This was 
itself a direct reflection of the longstanding views among proponents that regular failure to 
produce the phenomena was a result of the nature of the phenomena, and that beliefs of those 
present might be responsible for success or failure.  
 
For several years, psychologists researching paranormal belief continued to do so on the basis 
of different definitions, measures, hypotheses and aims, all of which directly reflected 
different views about the reality of the paranormal. In short, these two versions of the 
psychology of paranormal belief can be seen as expressions of opposing beliefs about the 
paranormal; they have themselves been manifestations of the very beliefs that they have 
sought to understand. 
 
  
Summary and discussion 
 
Despite the various contexts, interests, networks and practices involved over the period 
discussed, it seems that we have been having the same argument for a very long time. Since at 
least the beginning of the Victorian period (i.e. before the emergence of Modern 
Spiritualism), the dispute has been ostensibly about the observed facts, both positive (the 
reported phenomena) and negative (failures, duplications and exposures). However, even 
when both sides have agreed about the facts, the same facts have been, and could always be, 
framed as evidence either for or against the reality of the phenomena. Thus, as the endless 
dispute over the observed facts has continued, both sides have also disputed expertise in 
observation. Scientific expertise, though an important theme, has not been the only form of 
expertise recognised. However, what these disputes have provided is an opportunity for 
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psychological scientists to construct their own expertise over that of others by deploying a 
psychology of error. All of this can be seen as part of the ongoing dispute over the reality of 
such phenomena, which itself can be seen as a manifestation of opposing beliefs about such 
phenomena. However, throughout all of this, beliefs have been not only formulated and 
maintained, they have also been cited (by both sides) as an explanation for the facts and as an 
indication of expertise. These arguments fed into a formal psychology of belief in the 20
th
 
century, in which two distinct versions have emerged, each reflecting one side of the ongoing 
dispute. 
 
What this hopefully shows is that an historical perspective can contribute to understanding of 
Psychology and psychology, of how Psychological knowledge has been constructed and of 
the subject matter itself. It shows that Psychological understanding of beliefs about 
extraordinary psychological phenomena has been part of a wider discourse about the reality 
of the phenomena, and has been continually shaped by different views on the latter question. 
It has been both an expression and a justification of a particular position of belief about such 
phenomena. In short, the Psychology of belief has been part and parcel of the subject matter it 
has sought to explain.  
 
History also shows that beliefs (both for and against the reality of the phenomena) have long 
been constructed and maintained in similar ways, and in ways that are quite compatible with 
the agreed upon facts. And, whilst it may be easy to regard the justifications of believers as 
ingenious ways of hanging on to their beliefs in the face of seemingly obvious negative 
evidence, critics have regularly been accused by proponents of engaging in similar tactics. 
That the former view has tended to prevail is itself a reflection of the sceptical majority view 
rather than of its self-evident truth.  
 
One practical implication of all this has been that there has been an asymmetrical 
understanding of belief. A psychology of error has continued to dominate the literature, and 
can be seen in the titles of journal articles (which invariably refer to belief in the paranormal 
rather than belief about the paranormal), of books such as How we know what isn’t so 
(Gilovich, 1991) and Why people believe weird things (Shermer, 1997), and of various 
hypotheses that seek to explain ‘belief’ rather than ‘disbelief’ (for example, the 
‘misattribution hypothesis’, the ‘cognitive deficit hypothesis’, and the ‘social marginality 
hypothesis’). In short, as might also be argued in the case of religious belief, psychologists 
have typically treated ‘belief’ rather than ‘disbelief’ as problematic, and sought to understand 
why people believe in the paranormal rather than why people do not. 
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However, what the history of these disputes shows is that expressions of disbelief are far from 
unproblematic, and a symmetrical approach shows that both sides engage in a great deal of 
discursive work in order to construct and maintain their position. And if, as cognitive 
psychologists do, one treats belief as a cognitive phenomenon that can be reliably represented 
via expression, then disbelief is equally worthy of Psychological attention. It might be argued, 
of course, that questionnaire studies naturally distinguish between belief and disbelief, and 
that findings provide information on both believers and disbelievers. However, introductions 
and discussions in published articles, as well as textbooks, have been overwhelmingly 
concerned with the former rather than the latter, and this focus has largely reflected the 
mainstream psychology of error approach that has long been a means of debunking such 
phenomena. 
 
Furthermore, Psychological questionnaires have relied upon particular abstract categories and 
the assumption that a particular expression at a particular time about these particular 
categories amounts to actual belief. This is not how beliefs (and disbeliefs) in the real world 
are manifested in expression, which is in a form that is invariably bound up with appeals to 
what is deemed appropriate evidence, and referring to specific events rather than abstract 
categories. If expressions of belief do indeed represent actual belief, then beliefs are not easily 
isolated from particulars, nor are they independent of reasons for holding them. 
 
They are also bound up with moral arguments. Just as they have been disputed in terms of 
their compatibility with science, so they have been disputed in terms of their compatibility 
with contemporary religious and social matters. For mesmerists, spiritualists and psychical 
researchers, the phenomena in question have been presented as not only true but also useful 
and good, from the possible medical benefits of mesmerism to the demonstration of an 
afterlife. For critics, such beliefs have been presented as not only wrong but also harmful, 
from comparisons with witchcraft to the dangers that such irrational thinking poses to 
progress and freedom. These various non-scientific considerations have been part of the 
process through which individuals have constructed and maintained their particular beliefs 
about extraordinary phenomena. That they have also been part of the process through which 
Psychology has constructed a scientific understanding of such beliefs only demonstrates that 
psychologists are people too. 
 
Finally, the longstanding attempt to disseminate the view that beliefs in such phenomena are 
the product of error, from the anti-mesmerism publications of the early Victorian period all 
the way through to recent sceptical texts, have been an active attempt to draw upon 
Psychological knowledge in order to change beliefs. So far as these have succeeded, the 
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Psychology of belief has been not only shaped by, but also shaped, the beliefs it has been in 
the business of studying. It is, then, one more example of how Psychology is both constructed 
by, and constructive of, its subject matter. 
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